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Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as
Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment
DEBORAH EPSTEIN*
In his reply to my article on workplace harassment law and freedom of
speech,' Professor Volokh does not respond to my most important critiques of
his earlier work. For example, he fails to grapple with the true complexity of the
problem by focusing exclusively on one side of this conflict of rights-the
burden that the law imposes on workplace expression. Equal attention must be
paid to the other side: the harm inflicted by discriminatory speech on employees
of a single gender. As I describe in detail in my original piece,2 these harms may
include: an adverse effect on the quantity and quality of a woman S3 work;
emotional and physical stress-related problems such as fear, anxiety, depression,
humiliation, nausea, fatigue, and headaches; and costs to the government of
over $130 million a year due to decreased worker productivity, sick leave
awards, and replacement of employees who leave their jobs because of sexual
harassment.
4
Since my earlier article went to press, the papers have been bursting with
horror stories about the differential (mis)treatment allegedly accorded to more
than 500 women workers at the Mitsubishi plant in Normal, Illinois. Consider
the harassing expression inflicted on just one of them-Sandra Rushing, who
worked on the chassis line. Ms. Rushing was forced to deal with male cowork-
ers who drew pictures of her engaged in sexual activities, labeled them with her
name, and placed them on cars moving through the assembly line, where they
would be seen by dozens of employees. On one occasion a male colleague
exposed himself to her. Ms. Rushing complained to her supervisor, but things
only got worse. One night, at the end of her shift, four male workers crowded
around her, demanding that she have sex with them and telling her that if she
* Visiting Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1988. I thank Michael Shuman, Freada Klein, and Susan Deller Ross for their helpful
comments, and Barbra Marcus for her research assistance.
1. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO.
L.J. 627 (1997).
2. Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the
Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 402-08 (1996).
3. The vast majority of gender-based workplace harassment cases involve male harassers and female
targets; for the sake of convenience I will use these gender roles here. Of course, situations do exist in
which the roles are reversed.
4. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 403-08. The private sector also incurs high costs due to gender-based
harassment. The average Fortune 500 company incurs sexual harassment costs of $6,700,000 per year
in absenteeism, low productivity, and employee turnover. This represents approximately $280 per
employee. Susan Crawford, Economic Impact of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, USA TODAY
(Magazine), Mar. 1, 1995, at 35 (citing 1988 Working Woman magazine survey, the "first scientific
sampling of its kind in the private sector," based on responses of "directors of personnel, human
resources, and equal-opportunity offices representing 3,300,000 employees at 160 corporations").
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refused, they would force her to do so. Terrified, she ran to her car, crying and
shaking.5 It is probable that Ms. Rushing, like hundreds of other women
workers at Mitsubishi, was routinely called "slut," "whore," and "bitch.", 6 It is
also likely that Ms. Rushing could not avoid seeing some of the many photo-
graphs depicting male employees and supervisors engaged in sexual activities
with prostitutes at Mitsubishi-sponsored sex parties; the photos were placed in
women's toolboxes and stacked in the plant's break rooms.7 Ms. Rushing's male
colleagues, in contrast, were able to perform their jobs free of any analogous
abusive expression. 8
Disregarding the scope and severity of such discriminatory harm 9 certainly
makes Professor Volokh's case easier. But it also removes his arguments from
the real-world aspects of the conflict and impairs his constitutional analysis.
Professor Volokh also fails to respond to my argument that workplace
harassment law survives First Amendment strict scrutiny. This tripartite test, the
most rigorous available under current constitutional doctrine and one that even
the strongest and most vocal supporters of free expression applaud, should be
used to resolve situations in which freedom of expression directly conflicts with
another fundamental right-here, the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the law.
As I discuss in depth in my earlier article,1° restrictions on gender-based job
harassment meet the first element of the test: they are supported by an interest
strong enough to be deemed "compelling." In closely related contexts involving
challenges to male-only membership policies in private clubs or sex-segregated
publication of job advertisements, the Supreme Court has held that the elimina-
tion of marketplace gender discrimination is sufficiently compelling to justify
restrictions on competing First Amendment rights." And the strength of the
state's interest is heightened by the fact that Congress enacted Title VII, 2 in an
express effort to carry out its constitutional obligation to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. ' 3
Current restrictions on verbal workplace harassment also meet the "neces-
5. Kirstin D. Grimsley et al., Sex Harassment: Tales of the Assembly Line; The Case Against
Mitsubishi, INT'L HERALD TRB., May 3, 1996, at 6; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Closing Argument; Defining True
Sexual Harassment, TEx. LAW., May 13, 1996, at 37.
6. Ellen Goodman, Harassment Battles Economics, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 6, 1996, at 8A.
7. Maria Shao, Mitsubishi Case Puts Spotlight on Harassment, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 1996, at 1.
8. Nor were male workers subjected to the physical abuse that Ms. Rushing and many other female
workers suffered. This included incidents in which male coworkers gathered around her, touching her
breasts and reaching between her legs to touch her crotch. Taylor, supra note 5, at 37.
9. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 402-08 (describing nature and severity of workplace harassment).
10. Id. at 436-42.
11. See id. at 438-41.
12. Although Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994), does not expressly set forth a cause of
action for workplace harassment, the Supreme Court has read one into the statutory bar on employment
discrimination. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
13. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 436-37.
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sity" element of the strict scrutiny test. As the Mitsubishi case and others like it
demonstrate, gender-based abusive expression can be quite severe; if it is
allowed to continue unabated, the government will be unable to achieve its goal
of eliminating employment discrimination. And the need for preventative regula-
tion is underscored by the inability of the First Amendment marketplace of
ideas to operate as an effective deterrent here; because of the power disparity
between most harassers and their targets, women workers do not have a realistic
opportunity to counter harassment by speaking out in favor of gender equality.
In fact, studies show that most women are unable to stop or significantly reduce
sexual harassment, whether verbal or physical, without filing an antidiscrimina-
tion lawsuit. 14
Finally, restrictions on verbal harassment meet the third part of the strict
scrutiny test because the law is as narrowly tailored as possible while remaining
an effective tool for accomplishing the government's goal. Once a potential
harasser leaves work, he is free to express any view he wishes. And he may do
the same thing while on the job unless and until his target indicates that his
speech is unwelcome.
But Professor Volokh does not discuss these issues; he focuses his reply on
the fact that workplace harassment law can operate to restrict "political, artistic,
religious, and socially themed speech," 15 rather than "only hard-core pornogra-
phy, personal slurs, and repeated indecent propositions."' 6 He fears that this
problem is exacerbated by the risk that some employers, chilled by the threat of
liability, may suppress isolated political statements that alone would not violate
the law. 17
I do not challenge these assertions. However, I do take issue with Professor
Volokh's attempt to imbue them with a significance that is unsupported by First
Amendment theory or doctrine.
In Part I of this article, I examine Professor Volokh's prioritization of political
over nonpolitical, or "low value," speech and demonstrate that the creation of
such a hierarchy of protection conflicts with the underlying values of the Free
Speech Clause. In Part II, I consider the importance of context in the constitu-
tional analysis of harassing speech and discuss how, by disregarding this factor,
Professor Volokh distorts his analysis. In my earlier article, I examined gender-
based harassing expression in terms of its physical context-the workplace-
and its interpersonal context-the power disparity between harasser and target.
Here, I focus on the general frailty of employees' free speech rights on the job.
The weak nature of these rights, in contrast to the compelling government
interest in promoting job equality, strengthens the argument that harassment law
14. See id. at 442-43.
15. Volokh, supra note 1, at 628. I do not mean to imply that Professor Volokh concedes these points
by deciding to disregard them. But by failing to take on the problem of verbal workplace harassment in
its full complexity, he reduces the persuasive power of the argument he does make.
16. Id. at 627.
17. Id. at 645-46.
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survives First Amendment strict scrutiny. In Part III, I demonstrate that only a
small chilling effect may be attributed to hostile environment harassment law.
Much of the enormous chill that Professor Volokh posits is countered by the
rigorous definitional requisites of a harassment claim. In addition, a large
portion of the speech that harassment regulations could chill is already legally
restricted by Title VII's ban on intentional discriminatory conduct. Finally, in
the limited instances where employers are censoring speech by adopting draco-
nian antiharassment policies, the law is not to blame; the problem stems from a
dearth of sophisticated legal advice.
I. PROFESSOR VOLOKH'S POLTCAIJNON POLITICAL HIERARCHY
OF PROTECTED EXPRESSION IS A FALSE DICHOTOMY THAT
THREATENS FUNDAMENTAL FREE SPEECH VALUES
Professor Volokh argues that the constitutional failure of workplace harass-
ment law derives primarily from its impact on what he dubs political or "core
protected" speech. He does not define these terms, except to make clear that he
uses "political" in a fairly broad sense, to include religious and social commen-
tary as well as "legitimate" art. Although he is deeply concerned about the
regulation of such expression, he posits that if workplace harassment law could
be rewritten to immunize political speech, it would survive First Amendment
challenge. 18
I agree with Professor Volokh's assessment that a substantial amount of
harassing workplace speech may be broadly characterized as political. When a
person says, "There's nothing worse than having to work around women," 19 he
is, at least in part, expressing a political view about gender roles in our society.
But how is this different when it comes to the kind of speech that Professor
Volokh defines as nonpolitical and low in value, such as personal slurs, indecent
propositions, and pornography? 20 Most sexist slurs, whether personal or imper-
sonal, convey political ideas about gender superiority and inferiority.2' Simi-
18. See id. As Volokh puts it at one point:
Of course, if the environment would have been abusive even without the political statements,
a court could certainly say: "Setting aside the political statements, the other behavior-say,
physical abuse and one-on-one personal slurs-was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute harassment." This would give the employee the relief he deserves, without basing
it at all on the protected speech. The difficulties arise when the court makes clear that its
decision was based... [in part on] political statements.
Id. at 646 n.62. Volokh also asserts that if harassment law applied solely to nonpolitical, "low value"
speech, "people's views" about its constitutionality "might be quite different." Id. at 1-2.
19. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
20. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 627, 646 n.62.
21. "Objectionable and discredited as these ideas may be, they are ideas nonetheless." Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 549 (making
related point in discussion of racist insults).
1997] FREE SPEECH AT WORK
larly, calling a female coworker a "cunt ' 22 or a "dumb ass woman",23 sends a
strong political message about her relative lack of power in society,2 4 and many
feminists believe that pornography communicates a "political-moral vision"
about gender roles.25
Perhaps the problem is most vividly illustrated by a comparison of the
following two statements, made by a male police officer to a female colleague:
(1) "Women can't make it as cops"; 26 and (2) "You're a woman; you can't
make it as a cop." Pursuant to Volokh's dichotomy, the former is a political
statement about gender-based differences in physical ability and, accordingly,
core protected speech that should not be subject to regulation. The latter is a
nonpolitical personal slur, which may be suppressed with little cause for
concern. This distinction is hardly a principled one. Should applicability of the
Free Speech Clause turn on such an inconsequential difference in a speaker's
turn of phrase?
27
22. A review of gender-based hostile environment harassment cases reveals that an astonishing
number of women workers are referred to as "cunts" by their supervisors or coworkers. This particular
epithet is expressly cited in more than 20 federal cases that resulted in reported decisions; numerous
additional claims must have been filed in cases that did not conclude with a published opinion, that
came before state tribunals, or that settled out of court. The frequent use of this gender-based
derogatory term is a graphic reminder of how words can contribute to the differential treatment of
women on the job. The idea of an equivalently abusive, male-gendered epithet being hurled at men at a
similar rate challenges the imagination.
Professor Volokh sanitizes the debate by avoiding the graphic language that riddles the case law.
Although such language is disturbing, it is impossible to grasp the real-world situation facing women
workers without confronting it. A few examples of the "cunt" cases follow: In Hurley v. Atlantic City
Police Department, 933 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1996), police officer Donna Hurley's supervisor referred
to her as "dumb cunt"; male colleagues regularly called women "cunts"; and coworkers placed a
sexually graphic drawing of Ms. Hurley on the bathroom wall, accompanied by doggerel that began:
"Oh sweet Donna Hurley/With cunt hair so curley [sic] .... Id. at 402 n.2. Mary Carr, a female
tinsmith apprentice, was subjected on a daily basis to comments such as, "I won't work with any cunt";
was continually referred to as "cunt"; found "cunt" painted on her toolbox; and received an obscene
Valentine's Day card addressed to "Cunt." Carr v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir.
1994). Kim Balletti worked in a newspaper pressroom; her coworkers called her "fucking cunt" and
placed a tube of vaginal cream labelled "Kim's Kunt Kreme" in her work station. Balletti v.
Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539, 1542-43 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
23. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
24. See Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 25 (1990).
25. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1137, 1182 (1984); see also NADINE STRossEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY 38 (1995); Nan D. Hunter &
Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., in American
Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (1987-88).
26. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 473 (1995) ("Physically, the police broads just don't got it!").
27. Professor Volokh's "political speech" analysis is disserved by his method of pulling isolated
statements from the case law and arguing that they illustrate the law's inappropriate suppression of core
protected speech. The cases he cites fail to support his theory. As one example, Volokh states that a
court found a hostile religious environment based in part on the fact that plaintiff was required "to
suffer reference to the Holocaust by one of [his supervisors]." Volokh, supra note 1, at 631 n.14
(internal quotation marks and parentheticals omitted). This sounds like a politically correct judge run
amok. But consider the additional evidence offered by Deputy U.S. Marshal Robert Turner in support
of his racial and religious discrimination claims: Turner was "only given limited access to the full range
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Moreover, Professor Volokh's apparent willingness to rely on a value-based
hierarchy of expression, in which political speech receives priority, cannot be
reconciled with a deep commitment to fundamental free speech values. 28 "[A]ll
attempts to create content-based subcategories [of expression] entail at least
some risk that government will in fact be discriminating against disfavored
points of view.", 29 To frame the issue in Professor Volokh's own terms, who is
to judge whether a particular instance of expression is low or high in value? The
professor should heed his own advice: "[W]e can't judge [a rule] simply by
how we would apply it ourselves. We must judge it by how we might expect it
to be applied by the variety of fact-finders in our judicial system.",30
I prefer to start from the more speech-protective assumption that virtually all
expression burdened by hostile work environment harassment law is political,
or "high value."' 3 1 This raises the next question: Is it possible to insulate
of duties and opportunities" of his job, and these restrictions (not placed on non-Jewish, non-white
Marshals) harmed his efforts to obtain pay raises and promotions; he was denied a full opportunity to
work overtime hours; was disciplined more harshly than his black colleagues; and was told to "get his
white ass out of the office because this is a black office, for blacks, supervised by blacks." Turner v.
Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (D.D.C. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Turner's black
colleagues also made repeated derogatory comments about his religion. A supervisor told a Holocaust
joke about how the high cost of Germany's post-World War H1 reconstruction was due to its substantial
use of gas during the war; colleagues commented that it was appropriate for Mr. Turner to collect
money for a charity drive, because Jews are skilled in dealing with money; and when he executed a writ
at a jewelry store, coworkers commented that being a jeweller was something for Jews. Id. These facts
are difficult to square with Professor Volokh's portrayal of this case as one that relied inappropriately on
core protected speech.
Similarly, Volokh claims a court found a hostile environment based 'largely" on "caricatures of
naked men and women, animals with human genitalia" and a sexually explicit cartoon. Volokh, supra
note 1, at 633 (internal quotation marks omitted). But in ruling that the plaintiff, Barbara Cardin, was
subjected to illegal gender-based harassment, the court also relied on the following: a senior manager
grabbed her by the buttocks in front of several of her coworkers; the company's general manager
referred to women as "cunts"; the controller told Ms. Cardin that "all women are equal on their
bellies"; and two senior managers widely disseminated a false rumor that Ms. Cardin was having an
affair with another employee, causing her husband to leave her for several days. Cardin v. Via Tropical
Fruits, Inc., No. 88-14201-CIV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16302, at *27 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 1993).
28. Even speech that Professor Volokh dubs "low value," such as obscenity, may be critically
important to full and robust debate on a particular issue. In Professor Laurence Tribe's words:
[lI]n the last analysis, suppression of the obscene persists because it tells us something about
ourselves that some of us ... would prefer not to know. It threatens to explode our uneasy
accommodation between sexual impulse and social custom-to destroy the carefully-spun
social web holding sexuality in its place.... [Tihe desire to preserve that web by shutting out
the thoughts and impressions that challenge it cannot be squared with a constitutional
commitment to openness of mind.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 919 (2d ed. 1988).
29. Id. § 12-18, at 940; see also STROSSEN, supra note 25, at 37-40, 50-54; Daniel A. Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a Central Concept in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975); Martin H. Redish,
The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978).
30. Volokh, supra note 1, at 634-35.
31. Of course, one would be hard-pressed to characterize as political many of the statements that
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gender-based discriminatory speech from regulation simply by labeling it politi-
cal?
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER POLITICAL
OR OTHERWISE, CANNOT OCCUR IN A CONTEXTUAL VACUUM
In Professor Volokh's view, political speech is "core protected"-end of
discussion. But this constitutional analysis occurs in a contextual vacuum; he
does not address the complex relationship between the content and context of
expression that is integral to modem First Amendment jurisprudence. Although
many theorists agree that the inherent social value of political expression
justifies special concern about its protection,32 the Constitution clearly permits
the government to regulate it in a wide range of circumstances.
For example, although the slogan "Abortion makes you the mother of a dead
baby",33 is a political statement, the right to shout it varies depending on
whether the speaker is in a public park or on the premises of an abortion clinic,
where the targeted audience is captive and has no realistic way to avoid the
speech.34 Similarly, the government may prohibit focused picketing at an
individual's residence, even if the picket is conducted by anti-abortion activists
bearing political placards and the home is one of a doctor who performs
abortions. 35 A statement that defames a public official may well constitute
political commentary, but it is against the law if said with reckless disregard for
its truth or falsity.36 "I'd like to kill the President" surely has political meaning,
but if spoken seriously, it is punishable as a criminal threat. 37 Put simply,
political speech can claim no talismanic immunity from regulation.38
have contributed to the existence of a hostile work environment. For example, receptionist Judith
Jones's employer told her that someday her breasts would be his; he also said she should spend more
time in the kitchen, where the temperature was lower and he could see her nipples better. Jones v.
Wesco Invs., 846 F.2d 1154, 1155 (8th Cir. 1988). While Leta Fay Ford worked as a buyer for Revlon,
her supervisor repeatedly told her, "I want to fuck you. I am going to fuck you." Ford v. Revlon, 734
P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. 1987). And when police sergeant Donna Hurley couldn't find her coffee mug, a
male coworker asked her "if she wanted to drink out of his jock cup." Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396, 406 (D.N.J. 1996).
32. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
33. Darrel Rowland, Though Kept at Bay, Critics Get Their Say, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Aug. 13,
1996, at 5A (quoting anti-abortion protesters).
34. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Epstein, supra note 2, at 421-29.
35. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
36. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). In Watts, the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a statute criminalizing willful threats on the life of the President. If such statements were made
as part of a stand-up comedy routine, however, they might be in bad taste, but the speaker would be
immune from punishment. See id. at 705 (overturning conviction of individual who stated that if ever
inducted into the army, "the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.," on grounds that context
demonstrated statement was hyperbole protected by First Amendment).
38. Context plays an equally important role in determining the state's ability to regulate what Volokh
would call nonpolitical speech. If any part of the "fighting words" doctrine survives, it is tightly bound
by a contextual framework: the speech must be made in the midst of a face-to-face confrontation in
1997]
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The free speech rights of harassers are no different; they are limited by the
contextual constraints of the workplace. My original article contains an exten-
sive analysis of the First Amendment implications of two fundamental contex-
tual issues that are directly relevant here. First, what is the physical location
where harassing expression occurs, and to what extent is a targeted worker
either captive to it or able to avoid it? Second, what is the interpersonal context,
and to what extent does the power disparity between harassers and targeted
workers contribute to a target's captivity and restrict her freedom to respond?39
I will not repeat that discussion here. But another aspect of the context issue
needs to be explored: How strong are workers' First Amendment rights while
they are on the job?40
I am sympathetic to a person's desire to express himself at work, where he
probably spends a sizable portion of his waking hours. But the free speech
rights of employees in the workplace are weak at best; as a general rule they
must obey their employer's edicts about what they can and cannot say. In the
private sector, for example, no general principle of freedom of expression exists
at all. An at-will employee can be fired for almost any reason (or no reason),
including his decision to call female coworkers "cavern cunts,", 4 1 or to tell his
which it is likely to provoke the listener to violence. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). As Professor Greenawalt puts it, "Forms of expression
vary so much in their contexts and inflections that one cannot specify particular words or phrases as
always being 'fighting.' What is gross insult in one setting is crude humor in another." Kent
Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. B. FouND. REs. J. 645, 770. Similarly, even the kind of
speech that the Court values least-obscenity-must be measured in the context of changing contempo-
rary community standards. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
39. Epstein, supra note 2, at 420-33.
40. Professor Volokh claims to be "puzzled" by my assertions that the reach of workplace harass-
ment law is generally limited to the physical location of the job site, and that I was unable to locate any
post-Vinson case in which a court relied on speech outside the worksite to support a finding of hostile
environment. He states that he was able to find contradictory cases with ease. But the cases he cites do
not support his proposition.
Professor Volokh asserts that in Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the
court "rel[ied] in part on a coworker calling [Bersie] at home" in "applying Vinson." Volokh, supra
note 1, at 629 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is true that the court's recitation of "Facts"
includes an incident in which one of Ms. Bersie's coworkers called her at home and "goaded her about
her absence from work"; but the court never references this fact in its "Analysis" section, in which it
considers whether a hostile environment existed. Professor Volokh's claim that this opinion demon-
strates the court's "reliance" on the call at home is insupportable; one might just as well claim that the
court relied on its recitation of the fact that Ms. Bersie was a "39-year-old mother of two." Bersie, 399
N.W.2d at 142. Volokh's point is undermined even further by the fact that the court later ruled against
Ms. Bersie, holding that no hostile environment existed. Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 417 N.W.2d 288, 290
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Professor Volokh also cites Bartlett v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Wash. 1993), for its
failure to "even hint[]" that a sexually explicit card which plaintiff received at home could not support
a hostile work environment. Volokh, supra note 1, at 629 n.6. But the court's analysis consists of a
single sentence in which it concludes that the evidence is "insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a
sexual harassment or hostile environment claim." Bartlett, 835 F. Supp. at 1262. Professor Volokh may
believe that the court should have engaged in a more detailed analysis, but he can hardly claim that this
opinion supports the use of extraworkplace incidents as a basis for a Title VII harassment claim.
41. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988).
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female supervisees that they should dress in a way that exposes their breasts.4 2
Even in the public sector, where the First Amendment applies in a limited sense,
employees can be fired for speech that is unrelated to matters of public concern
or that disrupts workplace efficiency or harmony.43 The limited scope of a
worker's ,right to speak freely on the job has long been justified on the ground
that although such speech is valuable and important, the workplace is not
designed as a forum for employees to "discuss matters of great importance to
themselves, perhaps to society as a whole, but not to the employer." 44 After all,
in the words of the Seventh Circuit, "the workplace is for working."
45
The discrete areas in which employee speech has been singled out for special
protection only highlight the general absence of First Amendment limits on
employer control. For example, several statutes now prohibit employer retalia-
tion against whistleblowing employees who make complaints or participate in
regulatory proceedings.46 Previously, even this kind of worker speech, which
provides crucial information about safety and security concerns, was vulnerable
to suppression and could be grounds for dismissal.
Even employers have limited rights of expression on the job. For example, an
employer cannot engage in speech that could unfairly interfere with a union
election.47 This restriction on employer expression is justified by the state's
interest in ensuring the adequate protection of workers' rights. 48 A similar logic
may be applied to sexual harassment law; its restriction on workplace expres-
sion is justified by the state's interest in preventing gender-based employment
discrimination.4 9
Professor Volokh's approach to the problem appears to turn Title VII, a civil
rights statute designed to eradicate the serious social problem of employment
discrimination, into a vehicle for converting the workplace into a First Amend-
ment sanctuary. Before the statute was enacted, an employer certainly could fire
someone for constantly referring to female employees as "dumb ass women"
while treating their male counterparts in a respectful, professional manner.
42. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
43. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (recognizing "the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees");
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see
also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
44. May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1986).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1994) (prohibiting employer retalia-
tion against federal employees who report fraud or abuse); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(4) (1994) (prohibiting employer retaliation against employees who file charges or testify under
the Act); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994) (prohibiting employer
retaliation against employees who report violations of safety standards); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-41 (1994) (prohibiting employer retaliation against employees
claiming benefits under the Act).
47. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405
(1964).
48. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 429-33.
49. Id. at 436-50.
1997l
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Professor Volokh's theory would insulate this speaker from punishment, even
when the speaker's gender-based, abusive pattern of expression takes such a toll
that it forces women out of their jobs. Although I support the expansion of
workers' rights, this seems to be an odd place from which to start. As Professor
Suzanne Sangree puts it, "While cogent arguments can be made for empower-
ing workers and democratizing the American workplace, [a desire to protect
those who discriminate] is not one of them."-50
III. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF HARASSMENT LAW'S TRUE CHILLING EFFECT
Professor Volokh also argues that hostile environment harassment law has an
enormous chilling effect on workplace expression. He recognizes that the law
imposes liability only when harassment is directed at its target on the basis of
her gender and is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions
of a reasonable target's employment, thereby creating an abusive work environ-
ment. 5' But he claims that " '[s]evere,' 'pervasive,' 'hostile,' and 'abusive' are
mushy terms"; they are "too vague to provide much protection for speech." 52
But are these terms any more vague than others used in well-settled areas of
constitutional jurisprudence? For example, expression constitutes defamation of
a public official only if it is shown to have been uttered with "reckless
disregard" for its truth or falsehood. 53 It would be difficult to demonstrate that
this term is substantially more clear and precise than are the terms "severe" and
"pervasive."
But I certainly concede that workplace harassment law will result in the
suppression of some speech that lies beyond its intended scope. That is the case
with every regulation that affects expression. The extent of this "chill," how-
ever, is far less significant than Professor Volokh fears or the Constitution
prohibits.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, 54 much of the speech that hostile environ-
ment restrictions could chill is already legally regulated. For example, even if
all of harassment law were invalidated, Title VII's prohibition on intentional
discriminatory conduct would continue to provide an incentive for employers to
50. Suzanne Sangree, A Reply to Professors Volokh and Browne, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 603
(1995). Historically, the Free Speech Clause has been portrayed as a vehicle for protecting minority
views against a powerful and intolerant majority; it has been touted for its role in increasing individual
autonomy and democracy by promoting the speech of the vulnerable. But limiting Title VII's ban on
gender-based abusive speech will not accomplish this goal. Instead, it will protect the speech of the
powerful dominant group in the workplace (white men) and leave women and minority workers even
more defenseless.
51. Volokh, supra note 1, at 627-28. Professor Volokh's definition omits other essential elements of a
hostile environment harassment claim, including: (1) the harassment must be unwelcome to the target,
and this unwelcomeness must be communicated to the harasser; and (2) the employer must perpetrate
or condone the harassment. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 412-14. The impact of these omissions on
Professor Volokh's analysis is discussed infra text accompanying notes 77-84.
52. Volokh, supra note 1, at 634, 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
54. Epstein, supra note 2, at 419.
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suppress gender-based abusive speech. Such statements constitute the most
common form of evidence that plaintiffs offer to prove that decisions to hire or
fire were made with discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court has firmly
decided that evidence admissible for this purpose includes expression.
In intentional discrimination cases, gender-based abusive or sexual state-
ments, when made or tolerated by management, are particularly probative
because of the inherent difficulty of proving state of mind. Given that "[d]efen-
dants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus
nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it," plaintiffs typically must rely on
circumstantial evidence of their employers' intent.56 The courts consistently
have held that a wide range of indirect evidence is admissible to prove intent-
even evidence that in other situations might be excluded as irrelevant or more
prejudicial than probative.57
For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,58 a female accountant who was
denied partnership sued her firm for intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender. At trial, she introduced into evidence a partner's repeated statements
that "he could not consider any woman seriously as a partnership candidate and
believed that women were not even capable of functioning as senior manag-
ers." 59 The Supreme Court found in Ms. Hopkins's favor, relying in part on
these gender-based derogatory comments.6°
Professor Volokh disputes the significance of this point, arguing that harass-
ment law "covers much more speech than the kind that's likely to be used as
evidence of discriminatory animus in employment decisions."' 6' Specifically, he
claims that illegal intent can be proven only through the speech of supervisors,
and only if it directly relates to the employment decision.62 But the case law
contradicts these assertions.
55. See id. The First Amendment "does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech ... to prove
motive or intent. Evidence of a defendant's previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted
in ... trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy, reliability, and the like." Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
56. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
57. See, e.g., id. at 697-98. As one court noted,
Circumstantial proof of discrimination typically includes unflattering testimony about the
employer's history and work practices--evidence which in other kinds of cases may well
unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. In discrimination cases, however, such
background evidence may be critical for the jury's assessment of whether a given employer
was more likely than not to have acted from an unlawful motive.
Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1988).
58. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
59. id. at 236.
60. Id. at 236, 256-58; see also Tomsic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir.
1996) (supervisor's comments about one plaintiff lacking incentive to work hard because her husband
made too much money and another plaintiff risking potential marital problems because soon she would
be earning more than her husband held admissible as indirect evidence of employer's intent to
terminate plaintiffs on basis of gender).
61. Volokh, supra note 1, at 638 n.34.
62. See id.
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First, the speech of coworkers as well as supervisors repeatedly has been held
to constitute indirect evidence of an employer's intent in cases based on
discriminatory conduct. In Samarzia v. Clark County,6 3 for example, the Ninth
Circuit held that coworkers' references to the plaintiff as "senile" constituted
relevant circumstantial evidence that his termination was the result of age
discrimination. 64 The Eighth Circuit has arrived at the same conclusion based
on a slightly different theory. In Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co.,65 a race-based
discriminatory discharge case, the plaintiff testified that white coworkers sub-
jected him and other black employees to racial slurs, and that when the abusive
language was reported to a supervisor, the supervisor failed to take any correc-
tive action. The court approved admission of this testimony into evidence,
holding that an employer's tolerance of racist speech by coworkers tended to
show the existence of a discriminatory motive.66
Second, speech need not be directly related to a challenged employment
decision to be admitted as proof of illegal intent. A female teacher claiming
discriminatory termination may prove impermissible motive through evidence
of student harassment claims that have been filed against the school.6 7 A
supervisor's comments about female employees, including the size of their
breasts, the way they walk, and the way they move, have been deemed
indicative of his gender-biased motive in firing another woman worker.68 And
evidence that a supervisor occasionally directed racial slurs at the plaintiff and
other black employees "is certainly probative" of a race-based discriminatory
discharge claim.
69
63. 859 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 91-92. Plaintiff offered other forms of indirect evidence as well, including discriminatory
statements made and actions taken by his supervisors. The court did not determine whether the proof
plaintiff adduced was sufficient to prove discriminatory intent but held that it was relevant and
admissible, and for this reason it reversed the trial court's directed verdict for the defendants. Id.; see
also Blake v. J.C. Penney Co., 894 F.2d 274, 276-78 (8th Cir. 1990) (coworkers calling plaintiff "senile
old woman" and "senile old thing" held to be admissible evidence of discriminatory motive in
age-based termination claim where employer tolerated such insults).
65. 31 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 1994).
66. Id. at 673-74; see also Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1994); Mullen v.
Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1988); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d
928 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983); O'Keefe v. General Accident Ins. Co., 918 F. Supp.
115 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 898 F Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Pakizegi v. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp. 901 (D. Mass. 1993), affd without opinion, 56 F.3d 59 (1st Cir.
1995).
67. Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990).
68. EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly, in Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d
1475 (9th Cir. 1995), the court held that evidence of an employer's unwelcome sexual behavior toward
several female employees was relevant to the issue of intent in another woman worker's quid pro quo
harassment case. Id. at 1479-81; see also Sowers v. Kemira, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Ga. 1988)
(same).
69. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d
1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (disability discrimination case); Hawkins, 900 F.2d at 153 (holding that evidence of
harassment of other female employees admissible to prove gender-based disparate treatment and
retaliation claim); Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
supervisor's comment, "these old fogies are either going to have to comply or get out," although made
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Professor Volokh further argues that it "seems unlikely.., that a court would
admit evidence of sexually themed jokes or sexually suggestive pictures ... to
show that management was motivated by animus when firing an employee.", 70
But this is not the case. The courts have admitted closely related types of
evidence for exactly this purpose, including: jokes about how a female employ-
ee's husband "must love [her] big bazooms" ;71 racist jokes with the punch line,
"May all your babies be white"; 72 jokes that hiring a woman judge meant
taking her "out of the kitchen, tak[ing] her apron off, and put[ting] a robe on
her" ;7 3 "hostile and demeaning images" of the plaintiff posted by coworkers;74
and even photographs of the Ayatollah Khomeini and an American flag burning
in Iran, both posted by a coworker in her own cubicle.75
Thus, contrary to Professor Volokh's assertion, speech that tends to show
discriminatory intent in conduct cases is often precisely the kind of speech that
might be chilled by harassment law. Overturning hostile environment harass-
to an employee other than plaintiff, relevant to prove intent in age discrimination case); Williams v.
McCausland, No. 90-CIV.7563, 1995 WL 548862, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1995) (race discrimina-
tion case may be proved through employer's invidious comments about others in the employee's
protected group).
Neither of the two cases cited by Professor Volokh contradicts this principle. In Fuka v. Thomson
Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996), although the court held that plaintiff's evidence about
her supervisor's age-based remarks was insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent, it expressly
stated that if "considered in conjunction with other evidence, [the statements] could support an
inference of discrimination." Id. at 1404; see also Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526,
530 (10th Cir. 1994) (age-based remarks considered as potentially probative of discriminatory intent).
So long as gender-, race-, and age-based comments are probative in determining the existence of
discriminatory animus in a disparate treatment case, an incentive to chill such speech will continue to
exist. This incentive does not evaporate merely because, in some subset of weak cases, these statements
alone are insufficient to constitute conclusive proof of motive.
70. Volokh, supra note 1, at 638 n.34.
71. EEOC v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759, 766 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
72. Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 729 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1984).
74. Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 1994).
75. Pakizegi v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp. 901 (D. Mass. 1993), affd without opinion,
56 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 1995). In Pakizegi, the court allowed an Iranian plaintiff to submit evidence of two
photographs that a coworker had posted in her own cubicle, one of the Ayatollah Khomeini and one of
an American flag burning in Iran, in an attempt to demonstrate that plaintiffs termination was based on
her national origin. Although the court ruled against plaintiff on this claim, the mere fact that the
photographs were admitted into evidence creates the potential for a chilling effect on similar employee
expression.
Professor Volokh cites this case for an entirely different proposition--one for which it does not stand.
He asserts that the court characterized the two photographs as national-origin harassment of an Iranian
plaintiff. Volokh, supra note 1, at 632. But the case isn't a harassment case at all. Instead, the plaintiff
claimed that she was illegally fired on the basis of her national origin and, even more significantly, she
lost-the court granted summary judgment in the employer's favor. Pakizegi, 831 E Supp. at 908.
Professor Volokh makes similar misstatements elsewhere. For example, he claims that a court found
that the "use of job titles such as 'foreman' and 'draftsman' may constitute sexual harassment." Volokh,
supra note 1, at 631. But the court not only ruled against the plaintiff, finding that no discrimination had
occurred, it also expressly noted that "[t]he use of gender-based language and terminology shown in
this record does not constitute a Ttle VII violation." Tunis v. Coming Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 95 1,
958 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added), affid without opinion, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991).
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ment restrictions alone will not free employers from pressure to prohibit such
expression.
76
Of course, it is possible that a few employers will not regulate worker speech
solely to avoid liability for intentional discrimination but will do so out of fear
of facing a harassment claim. And there may be a small universe of gender-
based abusive or sexual speech that could be chilled by harassment law but
could not support an inference of intentional discrimination-perhaps the occa-
sional, mild, gender-based remark. But on the whole, when viewed in the
broader Title VII context, the incremental chilling effect directly attributable to
hostile environment harassment law is a relatively small one.
Professor Volokh also argues that because a hostile environment may be
created through the aggregation of numerous individual statements, "prudent,
law-abiding employers" have no realistic choice but to adopt a "zero-tolerance
policy" and suppress all gender-based abusive or sexual speech.77 But such an
extreme response is far from inevitable; Professor Volokh only reaches this
conclusion by failing to consider several essential elements of a hostile environ-
ment claim, thus defining actionable harassment far more broadly than does the
Supreme Court. In fact, hostile environment harassment law places careful
limits on employers' liability exposure, permitting the adoption of more moder-
ate speech-protective policies.
First, the law dictates that an employer cannot be held liable for harassing
speech or conduct unless and until the target clearly indicates that she does not
welcome it.78 Accordingly, an employer need not forbid all sexual or gender-
based abusive speech; instead, he may explain to workers that they may make
such comments until they receive an indication that a target finds them undesir-
able. Employers can provide training on how to recognize expressions of
unwelcomeness, including the possibility that in some circumstances silence
may be an indicator, and can further suggest that if a female employee's
response is unclear, the best strategy is to ask how she feels. By training male
and female employees to better understand each other, an employer may
effectively avert those harassment claims that arise out of miscommunication
without engaging in absolutist censorship.
Second, a plaintiff cannot prevail unless she proves not only that she finds her
76. Professor Volokh exaggerates the conclusion that I draw from this overlap in the incentive to
chill gender-based harassing speech. He implies that in situations in which some degree of chilling
effect is inevitable, I would advocate eliminating any limitations that could exist. He chastises me for
taking such an extremist position, pointing out that "the fact that we must tolerate some chilling of
speech doesn't demonstrate that we should tolerate more." Volokh, supra note 1, at 638 n.34.
But of course, I agree with him and firmly believe in the fundamental importance of cabining any
chilling effect that a law has on expression. I am merely attempting to pinpoint the precise extent to
which a chill may be attributed to workplace harassment law. My efforts to define the true scope of the
problem are intended to enhance, not impede, our ability to grapple with it.
77. See id. at 638, 648 and passim.
78. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Epstein, supra note 2, at 413-14.
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environment to be hostile, but also that a reasonable person would agree with her.7 9
By demanding reasonableness, the law assures employers that they need not use the
fragile sensibilities of a hypersensitive listener as a regulatory gauge. 80
Third, a plaintiff must show that the harassment is either severe or perva-
sive. 8 ' The required showing of severity varies inversely with the pervasiveness
of the abuse; because verbal harassment is inherently less severe than its
physical counterpart, it will be actionable only in extreme situations when it saturates
a target's work environment. This legal requirement therefore prohibits the imposition
of liability for a few stray remarks and makes it unnecessary to overcensor.
Finally, no employer can be held liable unless and until it receives legally
adequate notice of the problem.82 Even then, the employer's sole obligation is
to respond by investigating and, if necessary, by taking action to stop the
harassment. The case law interpreting this requirement demonstrates that an
employer need not overcensor; instead, it may ensure that a victim-friendly
grievance procedure exists and workers are encouraged to report immediately
any incidents that they consider harassing. An employer who takes these steps
has fully discharged its legal obligation.8 3
All of the above requirements operate together to ensure that by educating
workers about the scope of hostile work environment harassment law, training
them to improve interpersonal communication, and creating grievance proce-
dures that allow effective evaluation of and response to harassment complaints,
an employer can protect itself from liability while allowing workers breathing
84
room for expression.
Of course, as Professor Volokh suggests, an employer may find it easier to
avoid such calculations by adopting an overzealous zero-tolerance antiharass-
ment policy. But because hostile environment harassment restrictions carefully
carve out room for less draconian approaches, such behavior is not attributable
to the law's chilling effect, but instead to a dearth of sophisticated legal advice.
79. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Epstein, supra note 2, at 414-15.
80. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Epstein, supra note 2, at 414-15.
81. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67; Epstein, supra note 2, at 412.
82. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 412.
83. See id.
84. Professor Volokh is incorrect when he suggests that such an approach, like the one I proposed in
my original article, would necessarily abolish the law's "severe or pervasive" requirement. He
describes my earlier proposal as a speech-restrictive policy under which "[e]mployees can ... only say
gender-specific or sexual things ... until one listener objects. At that point, they must either shut up or
schedule a meeting with a designated EEO officer before speaking further." Volokh, supra note 1, at
637 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). But employees need not "shut up" at this point.
They may continue to engage in, look at, or post gender-based abusive expression: (1) in the presence
of anyone at all, off the job site; (2) in the presence of other workers who have not indicated an
unwillingness to listen; (3) in places within the worksite that are truly private and where the unwilling
listener would not be captive to it, such as a private locker or toolbox; and (4) in the presence of
workers who have indicated that the expression is unwelcome, if the EEO officer determines that the
speech does not violate the law. By protecting against employment discrimination while minimizing the
detrimental impact on speech, this kind of policy represents the best compromise possible-particularly
given the compelling need for workplace equality and the frailty of workplace free speech rights.
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And while I share Professor Volokh's concern that many consultants are
encouraging employers to adopt overbroad antiharassment policies and that
some employers are acting on such advice, many others are declining to do so.
85
As I have described elsewhere,86 if employers were overregulating and only
disobedient workers were engaging in harassing speech, increasing numbers of
employers should be asserting their speech-restrictive antiharassment policies as
a defense to liability. But no evidence of such an increase exists.
Freada Klein, one of the best-known employer consultants in the field, reports
that once employers think through the real-life ramifications of extremist poli-
cies, they quickly realize that "no business can or wants to live by" them. 87 If a
policy prohibits all physical contact, what happens when a secretary learns of a
death in her family and her boss of ten years wants to give her a comforting
hug? If a policy prohibits all requests for dates, what happens when two
employees meet at a company picnic, fall madly in love, and want to begin a
relationship?
Most employers recognize that an absolutist policy forbidding such interac-
tions could have a devastating impact on employee morale, which in turn could
adversely affect the business's bottom line. A large body of management
literature demonstrates the close relationship between these two factors. 88 For
example, companies have found that by adopting morale-boosting work-family
initiatives such as on-site child care, jobsharing, and flex time, they can attract
higher-quality workers, reduce employee absenteeism and turnover, improve
client retention rates, and dramatically increase their profit margins. 89 These
companies understand that they lose a competitive advantage when they harm
worker morale and that adopting a moderate, practicable approach to workplace
harassment is less costly than overreacting.
Many of these employers are providing breathing room for sexual speech and
conduct by creating informal complaint procedures for harassment victims as an
alternative to formal reporting. 90 A worker who believes herself to be a target of
harassment may consult in strict confidentiality with an ombudsperson, whose
position lies outside of the company's regular reporting channels. The ombudsper-
son may offer the employee counseling, mediation, or other informal assistance
85. Telephone Interview with Freada Klein, President of Klein Associates, Inc. (Aug. 22, 1996)
[hereinafter Klein Interview]. Similarly, the law's 10-year enforcement record in the judicial system
demonstrates that the primary danger is not the one feared by Professor Volokh--overbroad enforce-
ment-but the opposite: it is enforced too narrowly. The courts routinely apply a constricted interpreta-
tion of the severe or pervasive requirement in hostile environment harassment cases. See Epstein, supra
note 2, at 415-18 (discussing evidence of courts' narrow approach to employer liability in these cases).
86. Epstein, supra note 2, at 418.
87. Klein Interview, supra note 85.
88. See, e.g., Keith H. Hammonds, Balancing Work and Family: Big Returns for Companies Willing
to Give Family Strategies a Chance, Bus. WK., Sept. 16, 1996, at 74; Fran S. Rodgers & Charles
Rodgers, Business and the Facts of Family Life, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 121.
89. See, e.g., Hammonds, supra note 88.
90. A complainant may choose to pursue either one or both of these options.
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without exposing the harasser to censure or "chill." 9' As this more nuanced
approach illustrates, the problem of extremist policies does not lie with the law
itself, but rather with consultants who are offering employers an easy but
unnecessarily speech-restrictive way out.
And those employers who are adopting draconian antiharassment policies are
not enforcing them. Ever-increasing numbers of sexual harassment suits are
being filed and a vast body of data demonstrates that most female employees
continue to be subjected to unwelcome gender-based abusive or sexual speech. 92
Indeed, the real "chill" in the sexual harassment arena is not experienced by
harassers, but by complainants. Only a small percentage of workers who believe
they have experienced sexual harassment actually report the abuse to their
employers.9 3 Victims cite fear of reprisal as a key reason for their failure to
come forward. 9 4 Their concern is well-founded; one study reveals that twenty-
four percent of victims surveyed were fired because they complained about
sexual harassment. 95
For all of these reasons, hostile environment harassment law's potential
chilling effect on harassing expression is narrowly limited. This fact, viewed in
conjunction with the frailty of workers' free speech rights on the job9 6 as well as
additional contextual factors discussed in my earlier article,9 7 demonstrates that
the law presents no constitutional violation.
But let's put the constitutional question aside for a moment. Although we
have a strong disagreement about the scope of the problem, Professor Volokh
and I agree that some employers are suppressing worker speech that is not
restricted by hostile environment harassment law. This problem can only be
resolved if those of us who care about workers-about their speech and about
their right to equal treatment-join together to provide employers with more
sophisticated and subtle advice about how to handle workplace harassment. If
we can develop an approach that protects against unlawful discrimination but
also is sensitive to free expression, we can substantially reduce any potential for
91. Klein Interview, supra note 85; see also Mary E. McGarry, The Ombudsman Privilege: Keeping
Harassment Complaints Confidential, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 1.
92. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 402-08. Professor Volokh states that much of this data supports his
claim of an erosion of the law's "severe or pervasive" requirement because it fails to note the
frequency or intensity of the reported harassment. But in fact, the data demonstrate both that many
respondents report being subjected to unwelcome sexual comments, and that they themselves typically
do not consider such behavior to be "harassing" until it begins to occur as often as once a week.
Telephone Interview with Freada Klein, President of Klein Associates, Inc. (Sept. 11, 1996).
93. Freada Klein, Current Complexities in Sexual Harassment: What Every Employer Should Know,
ANDREWS SEXUAL HARASSMENT ADVISOR, Nov. 1995 (less than 5% report harassment); James E.
Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74 SOCIOL. & SOCIAL RES. 3, 5
(1989) (less than 10% report harassment).
94. Klein Interview, supra note 85.
95. WORKING WOMEN'S INST., RESEARCH SERIES REP. No. 3, THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
THE JOB: A PROFILE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN (1970).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 40-50.
97. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 420-30.
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chilling effect.98
What would such an approach look like? It would include an antiharassment
policy that sets forth a clear definition of gender-based harassment and includes
concrete examples that (1) illustrate the importance of context, (2) delineate
which areas of the worksite are sufficiently private to allow a broader range of
expression, and (3) help potential harassers to interpret the responses of their
targeted audience so they can be sensitive to unwelcomeness. It would encour-
age complainants to come forward and discuss potential problems with desig-
nated human resource staff members, provide both informal (fully confidential)
and formal complaint channels, and protect complainants from retaliation. It
would create mechanisms to assess the frequency and severity of harassment,
such as periodic workforce surveys and the establishment of a gender issues
committee.99
Finally, a comprehensive, effective approach to the problem would provide
workers and managers with in-depth training, so that potential harassers can
learn that preventing gender-based harassment on the job is not just about
conforming to the dictates of politically correct "feminazis." It's about whether
women who want to earn a living have to endure severe forms of abuse and
degradation from which their male counterparts are spared. It's about taking a
necessary step toward integrating women into the American workplace.
98. The importance of this work transcends the constitutional debate. Title VII's prohibitions on job
discrimination have led many employers to become increasingly familiar with data demonstrating that
employee harassment results in substantial business costs through sick leave, decreased worker
productivity, and loss of employees. See supra text accompanying note 4. "Corporations are beginning
to realize that investment to minimize sexual harassment in the workplace can yield startling economic
returns.... It is imperative that U.S. companies grasp an important fact: Great economic benefits can
be derived from establishing and maintaining a harassment-free workplace." Crawford, supra note 4, at
35. It is increasingly possible that these employers may decide to adopt strict antiharassment policies
even if the courts adopt arguments like those articulated by Professor Volokh and strike the law down
on First Amendment grounds.
99. See, e.g., KLEIN Assocs., INC., A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH [to sexual harassment] (1991).
[Vol. 85:649
